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FM AMEMBASSY BERN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4693
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0021
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RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0303
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0188
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0035
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0780
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0556
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0724
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0138
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA PRIORITY 0082
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 7604
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0060
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0861
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0041
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0074
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 1161
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0941
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 0042
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY 0014
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ NOV 0316
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0386
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0455
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0264
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 0185
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0592
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0123
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2079
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0102
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0694
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0111
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 0286
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0188
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0089
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1521
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0076
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 0046
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0664
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0787
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 0072
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0131
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2786
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0039
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0164

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 001093

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DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/RA (K.KESSLER) AND EUR/AGS
(Y.SAINT-ANDRE)
USUNVIE FOR ANDREA HALL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017
TAGS: [PARM](#) [IAEA](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [IR](#) [SZ](#)
SUBJECT: IRAN/IAEA: SWISS NON-COMMITAL ON BOG STATEMENT,
BUT GENERALLY NEGATIVE ON ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS

REF: A. STATE 157039
[1](#)B. BERN 1072

Classified By: Ambassador Peter R. Coneway; reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C) The Ambassador delivered the message in reftel A November 19 to MFA State Secretary Ambuehl, urging the GOS to take a firm line in a national statement at the upcoming November 22-23 IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) meeting. Ambuehl made no commitments regarding the content of a Swiss

national statement at the BOG meeting, but said that he did not think that the BOG meeting is the right place to discuss additional sanctions. He also questioned the effectiveness of sanctions. Ambassador reiterated the high importance of maintaining a united front behind the P5 +1 effort, and the dual-track approach that has been laid out -- increasing the pressure on Iran, while continuing to keep the June 2006 offer on the table.

12. (C) In a separate conversation, poloff deployed reftel A points with Andreas Friedrich, Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Friedrich confirmed that Walter Steinmann, Director of the Swiss Federal Office of Energy, and Swiss Governor to the BOG, will attend the November 22-23 meeting. Friedrich underlined, however, that the Swiss MFA will have the lead in determining Swiss nonproliferation policy with regard to Iran. Friedrich plans to accompany Steinmann to the BOG meeting. Commenting that DG ElBaradei's report on Iran was a "mixed bag," Friedrich said the GOS saw some welcome progress, but also was concerned about delays in the Work Plan and the IAEA assessment that its knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program is diminishing. While confirming that the GOS will deliver a national statement at the BOG meeting, Friedrich said that the contents of that statement were still being discussed at the level of FM Calmy-Rey. He said he therefore could not comment further, but indicated that it would be difficult for the GOS to join others in supporting a call for additional sanctions. Poloff emphasized that the success of the diplomatic effort will

depend on maintaining the strong, unified support of countries like Switzerland for the P5 +1 approach.
CONEWAY